“Citizens of a Free People”:
Popular Liberalism and Race in
Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia
James E. Sanders

“

A ll that belong to the Liberal Party in the Cauca are people of the pueblo bajo

(as they are generally called) and blacks,” observes an 1859 letter written by
Juan Aparicio, a local political operative who had undertaken the unenviable
task of recruiting these same “lower classes” to support the powerful caudillo
Tomás Mosquera’s new National Party. Aparicio tried to explain his failure in
this assignment, arguing that “this class of people will not listen to anyone that
is not of their party.”1 How had the local Liberal Party — controlled at the
national level by wealthy white men — become associated with blacks and the
poor in the Cauca region of southwestern Colombia? Or, more to the point,
how did Afro-Colombians and other lower-class people transform elite political organizations into “their party”?
In the Cauca, Afro-Colombians actively negotiated, bargained, and came to
identify with the Liberal Party, seeing it as a means to enter the nation’s public,
political life and improve their social and material condition. This alliance
would last for roughly three decades, from the late 1840s until the late 1870s.
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During this time, both popular liberals and party leaders continually negotiated
the meanings and terms of this association. This political bargaining arose most
powerfully and memorably over the institution of slavery but soon included
questions of land, rights, and citizenship. Many of the political transformations
and civil wars of this period hinged on the social dynamics engendered by AfroColombians’ embrace of popular liberalism, a phenomenon that would signiﬁcantly democratize Colombian republicanism. Eventually, the fates of AfroColombians and the Liberal Party became so closely intertwined that, especially
for Conservatives, liberalism and blackness became synonymous.
The Afro-Caucanos’ story occurred in both a postcolonial and—as their
efforts bore fruit—a postemancipation environment. Perhaps even more directly
than Rebecca Scott’s pioneering work revealed for Cuba, in Colombia slaves
and freed communities played an important role in abolition.2 This grand effort
was intricately linked with Afro-Colombians’ pursuit of full membership in the
nation via the medium of popular liberalism.3 People of African descent succeeded in making liberalism their own very early in the century and, for a time,
remarkably thoroughly. Ada Ferrer notes the uniqueness of the multiracial
armies in Cuba’s wars for independence. Similar armies emerged in Colombia
almost half a century earlier, and, although they were not as fully integrated as
Cuba’s, they played an equally profound role in Colombia’s national development.4 Along with their compatriots engaged in similar struggles across Latin
America, Afro-Colombians were part of a pan-Atlantic movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to contest the meanings of liberalism and
republicanism.5 Liberalism, republicanism, and democracy were not only created in the salons and statehouses of London, Paris, and Philadelphia; they were
also given life in the streets and surrounding countrysides of Cap François,
Havana, and Cali.
The alliance that developed between the Cauca’s elite and subaltern liber2. Rebecca J. Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor,
1860 –1899 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985).
3. While the popular liberalism of indigenous and mestizo communities has
received signiﬁcant study of late, less attention has been paid to the efforts of blacks
and mulattos. See especially Florencia E. Mallon, Peasant and Nation: The Making of
Post-Colonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1995); and Gilbert
Joseph and Daniel Nugent, eds., Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the
Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1994).
4. Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868 –1898 (Chapel
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), 3.
5. For Afro–Latin Americans, see George Reid Andrews, Afro–Latin America,
1800 – 2000 ( New York: Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming).
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als involved three dimensions: ﬁrst, bargaining over the social, economic, and
political structures of the region; second, the weight of Afro-Caucanos’ military and political support in the region’s elections and civil wars (which made
the Liberal Party unbeatable when it was not internally divided); and third, the
conﬂuence of Liberals’ conception of citizenship with Afro-Colombians’ appropriation of that identity. While a full accounting of this story would begin with
the wars of independence, the association of the Cauca’s Afro-Colombians and
liberalism crystallized in the early 1850s with the emergence of the Liberal
Party and the ﬁnal struggle to abolish the lingering stain of slavery.
Everyday Forms of Party Formation

During the turbulent years of 1850 and 1851, the Afro-Colombians of Cartago
(a city in the northern Cauca) gathered at the local Democratic Society —
a new, liberal political club — to await the arrival of mail from the capital, anticipating the news that Congress had ﬁnally abolished slavery.6 By the summer of
1851, two years after the installation of Liberal president José Hilario López,
the Liberal Party seemed ready to fulﬁll their promises and end the ownership
of human bodies in Colombia. The Cartaganos, a mixture of slaves and free,
waited to see if the words that continually circulated since the Liberals’ victory—
liberty, equality, republic, democracy —would mean anything for them.
The Cauca had long been under conservative control, and large haciendas dominated the landscape of the river valley and southern highlands, broken only by Indian resguardos ( protected communal landholdings) in the south
and the unsettled Quindío hills to the north.7 Afro-Colombians lived along
the coast, where gold mining continued to be of import, and in the central
valley, working on haciendas and in mines. In the early 1850s, one local geographer estimated that blacks and mulattos constituted 60.4 percent of the
region’s population, while the 1851 census reported 34.8 percent.8 A foreign

6. Ariete (Cali), 3 Aug. 1850.
7. Germán Colmenares, Cali: Terratenientes, mineros y comerciantes, siglo XVIII
(Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1997); Germán Colmenares, Historia económica y social de
Colombia, vol. 2, Popayán, una sociedad esclavista, 1680 –1800 (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo,
1997); José Escorcia, Sociedad y economía en el Valle del Cauca, vol. 3, Desarrollo político,
social y económico, 1800 –1854 (Bogotá: Biblioteca Banco Popular, 1983); and Alonso
Valencia Llano, Estado soberano del Cauca: Federalismo y regeneración (Bogotá: Banco de
la República, 1988).
8. For the local geographer, see T. C. Mosquera, Memoria sobre la geografía, física
y política de la Nueva Granada ( New York: Imprenta de S. W. Benedict, 1852), 96; for
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Figure 1. Map of the Cauca region.

observer thought the Cauca was ﬁve-sixths black or mulatto.9 While today
people of African descent are often thought of as concentrated in the coastal
region, the Cauca Valley was also a center of slaveholding and hosted a large
free black and mulatto population.10 By 1850 – 51 there were 10,621 slaves and
over 7,614 children of slaves (who, while nominally free, had to live and serve

the 1851 census, see Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land,
Divided Society ( New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 261.
9. James M. Eder to Secretary of State William H. Seward, Buenaventura, 24
Oct. 1868, in Dispatches from United States Consuls in Buenaventura, Colombia:
1867 –1885 ( Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 1948).
10. Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, “Esclavos y señores en la sociedad colombiana del
siglo XVIII,” in Ensayos sobre historia social colombiana (Bogotá: Univ. Nacional de
Colombia, 1968), 10 –13; Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of
Racial Identity in Colombia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1993).
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their parents’ masters until the age of 18 and then had to work for low pay until
age 25).11 Indeed, the Cauca, where a majority of the nation’s enslaved toiled,
remained the center of slavery in Colombia.12 Conservative hacendados not
only owned most of the region’s slaves but also controlled much of the land and
commerce as well. Almost all arable land was held in large haciendas, and the
remainder was cultivated by mestizo smallholders. Slaves and freedmen thus
had little access to land, with the exception of the common lands (ejidos) around
some cities such as Cali.13 The hacendado class sought to complete its economic dominance by securing aguardiente (cane liquor) and tobacco monopolies, thus eliminating outside income sources for tenants and sharecroppers.
While Afro-Colombians faced many problems, and even if most people of
African descent were not slaves, the destruction of the slave system nevertheless deﬁned popular liberals’ goals, actions, and discourse. Although slavery
was in decline following independence due to the manumission of many slaves
who had fought in the wars, the prohibition of the slave trade by the new
national state, and the 1821 law of free birth, the institution was still important,
both socially and economically. Afro-Colombians, slave and free, had been struggling since the colonial era to destroy slavery and to secure some economic and
political independence, but with limited success.14 During the War of the
Supremes (1839 – 42), José María Obando (who had been a royalist for much of
the wars of independence but would later become a Liberal leader) offered

11. Miguel Urrutia M. and Mario Arrubla, eds., Compendio de estadísticas históricas
de Colombia (Bogotá: Univ. Nacional de Colombia, 1970), table 8; for children, see
Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá (hereafter cited as AGN), Sección República
(hereafter cited as SR), Fondo Manumisión, tomo 1, p. 342, 354, 431, 437; AGN, SR,
Fondo Gobernaciones Varias (hereafter cited as FGV), tomo 216, p. 494 – 500.
12. Jorge Castellanos, La abolición de la esclavitud en Popayán, 1832 –1852 (Cali:
Univ. del Valle, 1980), 86.
13. Comisión Corográﬁca, “Descripcion de la provincia de la Buenaventura,”
[early 1850s], Biblioteca Nacional, Bogotá, Fondo Manuscritos (hereafter cited as BN,
FM), libro 397, p. 11, 16; J. N. Nuñez Conto to José H. López, Cali, 26 Jan. 1850,
AGN, Sección Academia Colombiana de Historia (hereafter cited as SACH), Fondo
José Hilario López (hereafter cited as FJHL), caja 2, carpeta 1, p. 70.
14. For struggles immediately after the wars of independence, see Francisco
Zuluaga Ramírez, Guerrilla y sociedad en el Patía: Una relación entre clientelismo político y
la insurgencia social (Cali: Univ. del Valle, 1993); Marixa Lasso, “Race and
Republicanism in the Age of Revolution, Cartagena, 1795 –1831” (Ph.D. diss., Univ.
of Florida, 2002); Aline Helg, “The Limits of Equality: Free People of Colour and
Slaves during the First Independence of Cartagena, Colombia, 1810 –15,” Slavery and
Abolition 20 (Aug. 1999): 1– 30.
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slaves their freedom if they joined his forces.15 Obando was defeated, and conservatives regained control of the Cauca; yet the eagerness of some blacks and
mulattos to challenge traditional power relations would not be forgotten.
By the late 1840s, middle-class and elite Liberals took renewed notice of
their Afro-Colombian neighbors’ anxieties and desires. Elite Liberals in the
Cauca were desperate for allies in their struggle against the Conservatives who
had traditionally dominated the region’s economy and politics (and were most
of the largest slaveholders). Although the Liberals did count on the support of
some powerful families, most of their ranks were made up of a few priests, shopkeepers, bureaucrats, lawyers, intellectuals, and smaller landowners.16 While
Liberals and Conservatives shared a similar economic agenda (except concerning slavery and monopolies), they differed sharply on the role of the church
and conceptions of citizenship.17 In the face of Conservative power, Liberals
began to recruit subaltern allies to shore up their precarious situation in the
Cauca, with an eye to both the ballot box and the battleﬁeld. Thus, when
Manuel María Alaix, a priest afﬁliated with the Liberal Party, urged President
López to abolish slavery, he did not stress humanitarian or economic concerns
but rather a political motivation: “The slaves that lose their chains bring to
society gratitude for the government that has lifted the yoke off them. . . . The
complete extinction of slavery is the magnum opus to which we must consecrate all of our efforts: 27,000 men that become citizens weigh something in
the electoral balance.”18
Liberals sought to mobilize the region’s plebeians through three broad initiatives: public ceremonies (especially ceremonies of manumission), the national
guard, and Democratic Societies. In the colonial period, the church, now allied
with Conservatives, had organized most important public events; Liberals

15. See Escorcia, Sociedad y economía, 82 – 84; Castellanos, La abolición, 62;
Rebecca Earle, “The War of the Supremes: Border Conﬂict, Religious Crusade, or
Simply Politics by Other Means?” in Rumours of Wars: Civil Conflict in NineteenthCentury Latin America, ed. Rebecca Earle (London: Institute of Latin American
Studies, 2000), 119 – 34; and Fernán E. González González, Para leer la política: Ensayos
de historia política colombiana (Bogotá: Cinep, 1997), 2:83 –161.
16. Escorcia, Sociedad y economía, 111–16; J. León Helguera, “Antecedentes
sociales de la revolución de 1851 en el sur de Colombia (1848 –1849),” Anuario
Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura 5 (1970): 61.
17. Marco Palacios, El café en Colombia, 1850 –1970: Una historia económica, social y
política, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1983), 29.
18. M. M. Alaix to José H. López, Popayán, 26 Nov. 1850, AGN, SACH, FJHL,
caja 4, carpeta 19, p. 1683.
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sought to open up public space and turn the traditional power of public ceremonies to their advantage. On the one-year anniversary of López’s presidential
victory, Cauca’s elite Liberals organized grand festivities that included artillery
salutes, music, parades, religious ceremonies, and speeches. Plebeians also participated, especially if they were members of the national guard. The Liberal
celebrations thus afforded subalterns a very public role in the social life of the
city. Liberals took advantage of their audience, and the centerpiece of these
ceremonies left no doubt about the Liberal program concerning the pueblo. In
Cali and Buga, the festivals concluded with ceremonies of manumission, during which presumably Liberal masters freed their slaves.19
Although undoubtedly Afro-Colombians were not particularly impressed
by the freeing of one or two slaves while the majority remained in bondage, the
ceremonies did begin to reinforce the association between emancipation and
the Liberal Party. As the Juntas de Manumisión (the institutions that oversaw
slavery) gained more funds, they freed more slaves, often in a grand ceremony
to ensure that Afro-Colombians knew who was responsible for their emancipation. One such spectacle in Cali began with speeches in the Democratic
Society and culminated in the central plaza with an emancipation ceremony for
46 slaves. After music and cannon ﬁre, three chosen slaves, each bearing a standard with “liberty,” “equality,” and “fraternity” emblazoned upon it, came forward to a table where the Junta de Manumisión presented them with certiﬁcates of freedom. As each new freedman left the table, Liberal women placed a
garland of ﬂowers on his or her head.20 A similar public ceremony marked the
19. José Joaquín Carvajal to José Hilario López, Buga, 17 Mar. 1850, AGN,
SACH, FJHL, caja 2, carpeta 3, p. 212; see also Annick Lempérière, “¿Nación
moderna o república baroca? México, 1823 –1857,” in Imaginar la nación, ed. FrançoisXavier Guerra and Mónica Quijada (Münster: Lit, 1994); Margarita R. Pacheco G.,
La fiesta liberal en Cali (Cali: Ediciones Univ. del Valle, 1992), 106 –11. For a
description of another public ceremony, see Ramón Mercado, “Programa para el
recibimiento del Benemérito Jeneral Lopez en esta Ciudad á su llegada á ella y al paso
del Cauca” [1851], Archivo Histórico Municipal de Cali, Archivo del Concejo
Municipal (hereafter cited as AHMC), tomo 114, p. 743.
20. Ramón Mercado, Narciso Riascos, Manuel Antonio Vernaza et al.,
“Programa Solemnidad del 2 de febrero de 1851 por la manumisión de 46 esclavos,”
AHMC, tomo 114, p. 478. The juntas had existed since the 1820s but had managed to
free very few slaves over the subsequent decades. Harold A. Bierck Jr., “The Struggle
for Abolition in Gran Colombia,” Hispanic American Historical Review 33 (Aug. 1953):
377, 379 – 85. Marixa Lasso notes that in the 1820s, manumission ceremonies were
designed to inculcate a sense of Colombian citizenship; I argue that by the 1850s,
Liberals hoped to foster a sense of citizenship as well as fealty to the party. Marixa
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manumission of 32 slaves in Popayán in October 1850. Afterwards, the libertos
marched arm in arm with Liberal ofﬁcials, shouting “vivas” to the government,
while Conservatives looked on with disdain.21 Popayán, the center of the old
colonial mining aristocracy and a stronghold of Conservatives and the church,
was considered one of the most traditional cities in Colombia. Yet in this bastion of power, built with lucre from mines worked by slaves, whites marched
alongside blacks through the town.
Liberals also utilized the national guard to disseminate their program.
The trainees did not simply learn military lessons but also received, in the words
of Liberal governor Ramón Mercado, “doctrinal exercises.”22 Many AfroColombians took advantage of this opportunity to gain some small amount of
power (trainees often kept their weapons). After emancipation, Conservatives
accused Liberals of “indiscriminately” signing up all freedmen into the militia.23 The national guard was doubly important to Liberals as a means of political mobilization: ﬁrst, it served as a conduit of political education, but more
important, it acted as a way of organizing their supporters in the eventuality
that politics extended to the battleﬁeld. The national guard was also linked to
the most important of Liberal initiatives, the Democratic Societies. Indeed, in
order to join Cali’s Democratic Society, one also had to be a member of the
guard.
These Democratic Societies provided the social space where elite and popular liberals began to form an alliance and share a common, public discourse.
The clubs emerged from the 1848 elections, as Liberals adopted a more aggressive campaign style. Adherents of Liberal candidate José Hilario López spoke
out about what he would do while in ofﬁce: both generalities, such as progress

Lasso, “The Harmony of War: Ofﬁcial Discourses, Race War Rumors, and
Grievances” ( paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical
Association, Chicago, 2003).
21. Manuel José Castrillón to José Hilario López, Popayán, 22 Oct. 1850, AGN,
SACH, FJHL, caja 4, carpeta 16, p. 1391; Manuel José Castrillón to Secretary of
Foreign Relations, Popayán, 30 Oct. 1850, AGN, SR, Fondo Manumisión, tomo 1, p.
434.
22. Ramón Mercado, Memorias sobre los acontecimientos del sur, especialmente en la
provincia de Buenaventura, durante la administración del 7 de Marzo de 1849 (Cali:
Centro de Estudios Históricos y Sociales “Santiago de Cali,” 1996 [1853]), xliii.
Conservatives harshly criticized Mercado for politicizing the guard. El Hombre (Cali),
10 July 1852.
23. Ramón M. Orejuela to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Hacienda Rosalía, 3 Feb.
1853, ACC, SM, doc. 28,960.
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and equality, and speciﬁcs, such as protecting access to the ejidos. An observer
noted that López’s adherents claimed their candidate would “break the chains
with which the oligarchy has oppressed the pueblo.”24 This rhetoric could be
interpreted in many ways by many people, but such language would have been
of particular interest to slaves.
During the 1848 elections, Cali’s Liberals founded a society to work for
López’s victory. Afterward, the young Liberals expanded the club’s purpose,
with an eye to creating a new society out of the colonial past that independence
had not fully vanquished. To build this new Colombia they would ﬁrst need to
build new citizens, in order to break the powerful hold centuries of colonial
repression had on the minds of the lower classes. They would teach Cali’s poor
about their program: about liberalism, republicanism, and democracy. They
would make citizens of the masses.25
They christened their club the Democratic Society of Cali (after a similar
political club founded by artisans in Bogotá) and opened wide its doors, inviting one and all — by which, of course, they meant men. Perhaps to their surprise, and certainly to the surprise of outside observers, plebeians decided to
attend. However, unlike in Bogotá, it was not just Cali’s artisans but also the
lower classes in general and workers from nearby haciendas who responded.26
Ramón Mercado (a ﬁery orator and Cali’s appointed governor) noted that the
24. Manuel Joaquín Bosch, Reseña histórica de los principales acontecimientos políticos
de la ciudad de Cali, desde el año de 1848 hasta el de 1855 inclusive (Cali: Centro de
Estudios Históricos y Sociales “Santiago de Cali,” 1996 [1856]), 13 –14.
25. Liberals were attempting to create a new political culture, as described by
Lynn Hunt for revolutionary France; Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the
French Revolution (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984). See also Eduardo
Posada-Carbó, “New Granada and the European Revolutions of 1848,” in The
European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas, ed. Guy P. C. Thomson (London:
Institute of Latin American Studies, 2002), 217 – 40.
26. This is an important distinction, since unlike Bogotá’s more studied
societies, Cali’s was not mostly made up of artisans, as the size of the society alone
demonstrates. At times it counted over one thousand members; Cali had nowhere
near so many artisans. In the early 1850s, Cali Cantón counted only 19,277 people,
of which only 1,160 were men “suitable to bear arms.” Comisión Corográﬁca,
“Descripcion de la provincia de la Buenaventura,” [early 1850s], BN, FM, tomo 397,
p. 16. For membership numbers of the Democratic Society see El Sentimiento
Democrático (Cali), 29 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1849. For the Bogotá clubs, see David Sowell,
The Early Colombian Labor Movement: Artisans and Politics in Bogotá, 1832 –1919
(Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1992); and Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Curso y
discurso del movimiento plebeyo, 1849 –1854 (Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y
Relaciones Internacionales; El Ancora, 1995).
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Liberal Party was “composed almost exclusively of the scorned masses.”27 Conservatives delighted in noting that the club and the party, if not a majority
Afro-Colombian, certainly counted many blacks and mulattos as members.28
Years later, another Conservative asserted that “blacks . . . are those that make
up the democráticas [Democratic Societies] of Buga, Palmira, and Cali.”29
The Liberals began a program of political education for the club’s members. Orators expounded on the problems of the day, and the literate read
newspapers aloud.30 Every week, middle-class and elite Liberals held courses
on the meaning of the constitution, the nature of democracy, the laws concerning elections, and the rights and duties of citizens.31 Soon, lower- and
middle-class members also rose to speak, exposing elite Liberals to popular
concerns.32
While Cali’s Democratic Society was the most active and powerful of the
political clubs, Liberals began to found new associations throughout the Cauca,
but especially in the valley. By 1851, Liberals had founded clubs in the valley
towns of Buga, Candelaria, Cartago (with over 350 members), Cerrito, Florida,
Guacarí, Palmira, Roldanillo, San Pedro (with over 160 members), and Toro.33
Florida, Guacarí, and San Pedro were mere hamlets of fewer than three thou27. Mercado, Memorias, xxxi. Conservatives agreed with Mercado, describing the
Democratic Society’s members as from the “most abject, ignorant, and miserable
class”; Ariete, 23 Mar. 1850.
28. Julio Arboleda, “El Misóforo, Número Noveno — Popayán 27 de noviembre
de 1850,” in Prosa de Julio Arboleda: Jurídica, política, heterodoxa y literaria (Bogotá:
Banco de la República, 1984), 347 – 348; Ariete, 3 Aug. 1850.
29. Manuel José González to Mariano Ospina, Cali, 21 Dec. 1859, BN, FM,
tomo 210, p. 127.
30. El Sentimiento Democrático, 31 May 1849.
31. El Sentimiento Democrático, 3 May, 14 June, and 21 June 1849.
32. Bosch, Reseña histórica, 27, 48 – 51; M. E. Pedrosa, Alcance a la reseña histórica
(Cali: Imprenta de Velasco, 1857), 5.
33. Ramón Martínez L. to José H. López, Buga, 24 Feb. 1850, AGN, SACH,
FJHL, caja 2, carpeta 3, p. 189; Carlos Gómez to Secretary of Government (national),
Buga, 15 Apr. 1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 216, p. 481; Manuel Tor[rente] ( page
ripped) to José Hilario López, Cartago, 27 Mar. 1857, AGN, SACH, FJHL, caja 5,
carpeta 6, p. 419; Carlos Gómez to Secretary of Government (national), Buga, 19 Apr.
1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 216, p. 489; Carlos Gómez to Secretary of Government
(national), Buga, 20 Apr. 1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 216, p. 491; La Sociedad
Democrática (over 160 names) to President of the Republic, San Pedro, 21 Mar. 1852,
Archivo del Congreso, Bogotá (hereafter AC), 1852, Cámara, Proyectos de Ley Negados
I, p. 47; and La Sociedad Democrática of Roldanillo to President of the Republic,
Roldanillo, 30 Dec. 1853, AC, 1854, Cámara, Informes de Comisiones V, p. 68.
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sand people, demonstrating that Liberals did not only seek alliance with the
urban poor.34 In the southern highlands, clubs held meetings in Popayán, Puracé,
and Pasto.35
The Democratic Societies also provided elites and plebeians with a public
space in which to build a shared discourse out of popular and elite ideas concerning republicanism, democracy, and rights. Afro-Colombians had made
important gains in the independence wars and subsequent civil conﬂicts, but
Conservative intransigence had prevented them from claiming a place in the
Cauca’s political and public life. The Democratic Societies united, under a
shared language of republicanism, Afro-Colombians desperate for change with
Liberals searching for allies. However, these discursive and imaginative developments only provided the basic terrain upon which elite and popular Liberals
negotiated their alliance. The main reason for the Liberals’ success was their
willingness to negotiate with their popular allies. Many of the concerns of elite
Liberals — abolishing slavery, freeing industry from monopolies, and ending
old forms of deference — coincided with those of the valley’s poor.
In club meetings, Liberals made promises of what their administration
would do and listened to members’ concerns. Governor Mercado wrote to the
president to report on the progress he had made in strengthening the Liberal
Party and to assure him that the masses were still under control. He urged
López to push Congress to pass several key reforms, stressing the need to abolish slavery, increase the importance of the national guard, end monopolies
(especially over aguardiente), make the judiciary more fair, “strengthen the
principle of equality,” and “procure land and industry for the poor classes.”36
Mercado summed up the Liberal program to win over the popular liberal masses
of the central valley, especially Afro-Colombians: aguardiente, land, emancipation, and social equality. Subsequently, national and provincial governments

34. The actual villages were even smaller, as less than three thousand people
lived in the villages proper and in the immediately surrounding areas; Felipe Pérez,
Jeografía física i política de los Estados Unidos de Colombia, vol. 1 (Bogotá: Imprenta de la
Nación, 1862), 381, 388.
35. Manuel María Ayala, President of the Democratic Society to the Provincial
Governor, Popayán, 5 Mar. 1850, ACC, Archivo Muerto (hereafter cited as AM),
paquete 49, leg. 76; José María Balcázar, President of the Liberal Society, to the
Provincial Governor, Puracé, 3 June 1851, ACC, AM, paquete 51, leg. 67; Vicente
Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 1 Nov. 1850, ACC, Fondo Arboleda (hereafter
cited as FA), sig. 1505. Artisans did found their own liberal society in Popayán.
36. Ramón Mercado to José Hilario López, Cali, 25 Jan. 1851, AGN, SACH,
FJHL, caja 5, carpeta 2, p. 142.
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began to pass legislation concerning slavery, monopolies, taxes, and the role of
the poor in society and politics in general.
The Democratic Societies did not just discuss these problems but also
acted to secure political change. From the time of its founding, members of
Cali’s Democratic Society heatedly debated the aguardiente monopoly, which
either forbade the poor from producing liquor or taxed them for that privilege.37 Many of the valley’s residents, especially poor women, engaged in
small-scale aguardiente production and sale; liquor production was of great
economic import to landless Afro-Colombians.38 Five hundred of the club’s
members signed a petition demanding an end to the monopoly system. They
complained not only that the tax hurt “the poor part of the nation” most but
also that the violent methods used to enforce it — hired goons who burst into
poor women’s homes looking for clandestine stills—violated their “most sacred
rights.” The signatories suggested that new taxes should apply to “citizens in
proportion to their fortune.”39 The club also called for full citizenship for its
members (most of whom, landless or illiterate, were not legal citizens under
the 1843 constitution) and pushed for progressive taxation. If petitions failed,
plebeians violently resisted the monopolists by sacking warehouses or boycotting licensed stores.40 Urged on by popular agitation, many of the coastal
and valley provinces began to eliminate the tax, and the national government
followed by terminating the hated tobacco monopoly.41 Along similar lines,
Liberals ended many of the harshest statutes concerning vagrancy, which had
forced freedmen to work for their old masters.42 The pueblo’s desire to control
37. Ramón Bermudes and 13 partners to Senators and Representatives (national),
Cali, 15 Apr. 1853, AC, 1853, Senado, Informes de Comisiones VI, p. 169.
38. The club particularly complained about how the liquor monopoly hurt “our
women”; El Sentimiento Democrático, 12 July 1849.
39. Residents of Cali (over 500 names) to President and Members of the
Provincial Legislature, Cali, 17 Sept. 1849, in El Sentimiento Democrático, 27 Sept.
1849. They wrote a similar petition in 1850; Sociedad Democrática de Cali (over 165
names) to Citizen Senators and Representatives (national), Cali, 9 Feb. 1850, AC,
1850, Senado, Peticiones IX, p. 13.
40. Bautista Feijoo, Jefe Político to Provincial Governor, Caloto, 6 May 1849,
ACC, AM, paquete 47, leg. 84.
41. David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993), 104 – 5; José Hilario López, Mensaje del
Presidente de la Nueva Granada al Congreso Constitucional de 1852 (Bogotá: Imprenta del
Neo-Granadino, 1852), 1.
42. Ordenanzas espedidas por la Cámara Provincial del Cauca en sus sesiones ordinarias
de 1852 (n.p., n.d.), 12.
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their own production and livelihoods coincided with the Liberals’ goal of
“freedom of industry.”43
Although these actions were important, the land question was even more
signiﬁcant to Cauca’s poor subalterns. Their concerns centered on the common
lands of Cali, which hacendados had begun to fence in and claim as their own
private property. Although Cali’s Democratic Society was generally supportive,
progress on the question of these ejidos was slow.44 By 1852, in spite of an
agreement to resolve the problem, the measurement of Cali’s ejidos had still not
been completed, due to problems with the surveying.45 An ofﬁcial warned that
the city should do whatever necessary to resolve “such a hazardous question and
thus avoid its becoming the apple of discord that will produce immense problems in the future and engender eternal hatreds.”46 Liberals knew that the ejidos
were a problem, yet their ideological program of individual economic liberty
had little to say about such an issue. Indeed, Liberals (especially at the national
level) generally viewed ejidos as premodern communal landholdings, like Indians’ resguardos, and sought to eliminate them.47 Yet the topic obsessed popular
liberals and was apparently under much discussion in the clubs. A Conservative
noted that there was much talk among the “plebes” of “the possibility of taking
over lands from the current property holders.”48 The liberal newspaper El Pensamiento Popular suggested that any practice that increased inequality was unjust,
but anything that aspired “to divide between all men with more equality the
common inheritance is divine.”49 Such language raised the hopes of popular lib-

43. El Sentimiento Democrático, 13 Sept. 1849.
44. El Sentimiento Democrático, 30 Aug. 1849.
45. “Dilegencia relacionada con la convocatoria hecha por el Gobernador a
algunos propietarios de terrenos, para arreglar el asunto de ejidos,” Cali, 28 Mar.
1852, AHMC, tomo 119, p. 348 (much of this document is severely damaged); Omar
Díaz Aparicio, Los ejidos: Desde Alfonso el Sabio en Castilla hasta nuestros días en Cali
(Cali: Imprenta Departamental del Valle, 1992), 58; Gustavo Espinosa Jaramillo, La
saga de los ejidos: Crónica legal—siglos XIII al XX (Cali: Univ. Santiago de Cali, 1997),
232 – 36.
46. Juan A. García to Members of the Cabildo, Cali, 4 Jan. 1852, AHMC, tomo
56, p. 278.
47. Luis Fernando López Garavito, Historia de la hacienda y el tesoro en Colombia,
1821–1900 (Bogotá: Banco de la República, 1992), 98.
48. Vicente [Arboleda] to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 9 Jan. 1850, ACC,
SM, doc. 27,357; see also El Sentimiento Democrático, 13 Sept., 30 Sept., and 29
Nov. 1849; Juan Aparicio to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Buga, 20 Dec. 1852, ACC, SM,
doc. 28,643.
49. El Pensamiento Popular (Cali), 22 July 1852.
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erals, but Liberal leaders had little chance of satisfying subaltern desires, even if
that had been their goal. Land would always be the most contentious issue
between elite and popular liberals, eventually rupturing the alliance between
them. Yet in the early 1850s, in spite of this policy’s complete variance with the
Liberal philosophy of individual landholding, many of the valley’s Liberals supported the continued existence of the commons. Popular concerns had forced
them to adapt their philosophy in order to satisfy their lower-class allies.
Of course, before 1852, the most pressing concern of Afro-Colombians
was not land but slavery. As ﬁnal emancipation stalled in Congress during 1850
and early 1851, it was also the issue which gave elite Liberals the most concern,
since it was the centerpiece of their program, both ideologically and as a means
of securing alliances with the Afro-Colombians. Congress’s failure to abolish
human bondage and the increasing militancy of the valley’s masses worried
Liberals with ties to subaltern allies and those sympathetic to the slaves’ plight.
These men, such as Governor Mercado, fretted over their position as interlocutors with the pueblo. They had made certain promises, and the people
seemed inclined to hold them to their word. Perhaps more importantly, many
of the valley’s subalterns were taking the matter into their own hands, violently
attacking Conservatives and their property. Mercado and his friends needed
something to reassure the masses that progress was being made and that the
leaders had not betrayed their followers.
Mercado knew that the valley’s residents were particularly anxious about
abolition, as they had now been waiting three long years for the Liberal government to act.50 Ofﬁcials did their best to reassure Afro-Colombians. The
popular José María Obando, the rebel leader in the earlier War of the Supremes
that had developed some antislavery aspects, spoke in Buga during that town’s
anniversary celebration of the Liberals’ ascent to power. A Conservative newspaper mocked the plebeian welcome, noting that “at the entrance to the city a
great number of blacks and vagrants” awaited him. The paper sneered that “a
loathsome and despicable black woman named la Maravilla” hugged him upon
his arrival and further insinuated that la Maravilla entered Obando’s lodging
that night. Obando promised the assembly that he was working so that the current Congress would ﬁnally abolish slavery.51 President López himself urged
Congress to act in March 1851, noting that slaves “craved the liberty so many
times sensed in the republican atmosphere.”52
50. Mercado, Memorias, xxxi.
51. El Clamor Nacional (Popayán), 22 Mar. 1851.
52. José Hilario López, “Mensaje del Presidente de la Nueva Granada al
Congreso Constitucional de 1851,” Bogotá, 1 Mar. 1851, AC, 1851, Cámara,
Memorias de los Secretarios del Despacho Ejecutivo IV, 97.
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The Liberal program was conscious and premeditated, and the party’s
plan to ally with the lower classes was not simply the whim of a few middleclass radicals. Although Liberals hoped to unite a substantial section of the
poor behind them, they arrogantly viewed Indians as too barbarous and religious for an alliance, and many poor mestizos had close clientalist ties to Conservatives.53 Afro-Colombians, however, already disdained Conservatives, as
most (but certainly not all) of the great slaveowners were afﬁliated with that
party. Thus, while Liberals attracted many poor white and mestizo adherents,
Afro-Colombians especially embraced and championed popular liberalism. As
Alaix’s desire to secure 27,000 loyal voters revealed, Liberals thought if they
could take credit for ending slavery, they could secure a large number of allies
for future electoral or military struggles.
Afro-Colombians did not just passively respond to such entreaties but
rather made the Democratic Societies their own and pressured Liberals to
act. Elite Liberals could not fully control the political space they had opened.
Their popular allies were not content to wait for legislative changes but, rather,
seized the initiative to act on their own. They not only encouraged Liberal
leaders to enact legal abolition but also challenged social and political subordination to the old master class and pushed for land redistribution and citizenship rights. Conservatives bitterly commented on the decline of respect
showed to them by their social inferiors, complaining that plebeians openly
insulted them in Cali’s streets.54 Crowds regularly marched through Cali and
other towns at night, shouting “vivas” to Liberals and insulting Conservatives.55
Popular liberals’ bold aims soon grew beyond insults and shouts. With
Liberals now in control of much of the state, popular supporters struck back
against the Conservative land- and slaveholding class in an eruption of popular
violence known as the zurriago or perrero. The zurriago began with the destruction of fences on Cali’s ejidos, in which as many as one thousand men and
women may have participated.56 Soon the movement spread to include attacks

53. James Sanders, “Belonging to the Great Granadan Family: Partisan Struggle
and the Construction of Indigenous Identity and Politics in Southwestern Colombia,
1849 –1890,” in Race and Nation in Modern Latin America, ed. Nancy P. Appelbaum,
Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 2003), 56 – 86.
54. J. A. Mallarino to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Cali, 7 Dec. 1850, ACC, SM, doc.
27,613; La Opinión (Cali), 1 Dec. 1848; Manuel [Luna] to Sergio Arboleda, Popayán,
18 Jan. 1854, ACC, FA, sig. 1518.
55. Ariete, 27 Apr. 1850.
56. Mercado, Memorias, lviii; El Clamor Nacional, 8 Feb. 1851.
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on Conservatives and their property throughout the valley. Bands of men,
often assumed to be slaves or ex-slaves, burned haciendas, tore down fences,
and assaulted prominent Conservatives and their families, turning upon their
former masters the hated symbol of slavery: the whip.57 The hacendado Ramón
Orejuela bitterly cried, “We are in the epoch of terror, and our throats are
threatened with our slaves’ knives.”58
What is surprising about the zurriago is not Conservatives’ horror or their
pronouncements that a race war was nigh, but rather the Liberal response. Of
course, many Liberals denied having any link with the perreristas, referring to
their actions as simply a problem of crime that had no connection with liberalism.59 Others, however, defended the perreristas, framing their attacks as just
retribution for centuries of Conservatives’ abuses under slavery.60 Of course,
Liberals did seek to rein in the excesses of the zurriago, but they generally did
this not by cracking down on the instigators but rather by seeking to redress
many of their concerns. Bargaining did not just involve laws or policy but also
accepting extralegal actions of allies who could not be completely controlled.
Conservatives feared not just the zurriago but also the Liberals’ unseemly
politicking with the lower classes.61 In Popayán, Conservatives bemoaned how
Liberals worked “to pervert the people of the pueblo” by showing concern and
attempting to mollify the masses.62 Referring to the Democratic Societies, Julio
Arboleda wrote to his relative, ex-president Tomás Mosquera, expressing his bitterness about the new situation—“the spirit of the mob”—in which, in his mind,

57. José Joaquín Carvajal to José Hilario López, Buga, 8 Nov. 1849, AGN,
SACH, FJHL, caja 1bis, carpeta 11, p. 551; Bosch, Reseña histórica, 35; Jefe Político of
Cali to the Cali Parish Alcalde, Cali, 17 Dec. 1850, AHMC, tomo 138, p. 185; some
miserable people to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Cali, 9 Aug. 1851, ACC, SM, doc.
28,252; Pacheco, La fiesta liberal en Cali, 141– 61.
58. Ramón M. Orejuela to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Hacienda Rosalía, 1 Aug.
1851, ACC, SM, doc. 28,148.
59. La Sociedad Democrática de Cali, Mentir con descaro (Cali: Imprenta de
Velasco, 1851), 1; Antonio Matéus, “Informe que da el ciudadano Antonio Matéus á la
jefatura política, sobre la correría que se le ordenó hacer por ella á las parroquias de
Florida, Candelaria i sitio del Belo,” Palmira, 30 Mar. 1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo
216, p. 484; Mercado, Memorias, lv–lvii, lxvii.
60. Observaciones para servir a la historia de la administracion del 7 de marzo . . .
(Bogotá: Imprenta del Neo-Granadino, 1851), 1; R. Mercado to Secretary of
Government (national), Cali, 24 Jan. 1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 165, p. 799.
61. El Ciudadano (Popayán), 3 June and 17 June 1848.
62. Vicente Cárdenas to T. C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 10 Jan. 1849, ACC, SM,
doc. 26,470; El Clamor Nacional, 19 Apr. 1851; Ariete, 10 Aug. 1850.
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the two of them would never participate.63 He acknowledged Liberal success but
ridiculed popular liberals as “barbarians,” “criminals,” and “blacks that run around
armed through the streets of Cali.”64 The cleric Alaix defended the Liberals’ plebeian allies, while issuing a prescient warning to Conservatives about their
increasingly open plans to test Liberals in armed struggle. Responding to
Arboleda’s slurs, Alaix wrote, “Those manumitted blacks, those ignorant men, are
the best national guards that the Republic counts as members, because they will
not ﬂee on the day of danger.”65 The following year would prove Alaix correct.
Wars and Elections

With abolition apparently nigh and popular liberals’ insolence and attacks
intolerable, Conservatives revolted. They had high hopes, given the elite support they enjoyed throughout the region and their dominance of Caucano politics and society since independence. However, they were sorely disappointed.
The reaction of the valley’s plebeians was amazing, even to the most dedicated
Liberals.66 Popular liberals rallied to their party’s standard with a zeal that
shocked most observers in the valley.
Liberals made sure that their popular allies knew the Conservative
rebels’ designs: namely, to roll back all the gains of the past few years. The
newspaper of Cali’s Democratic Society claimed that Conservative rebels
wanted to eliminate plebeians from politics and ensure that tobacco and aguardiente remained monopolies. They added that all the rebels were slaveholders.67 Provincial governor J. N. Montero noted that “the blacks knew that the
revolution had, in part, the object of impeding their liberty, and they let it be
known that they were ready at any moment to go and ﬁght for their freedom
and that of their children.”68 He added that blacks along the coast offered
63. Julio Arboleda to T. C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 7 Jan. 1849, ACC, SM, doc.
26,383.
64. Arboleda, “El Misóforo,” 347 – 48, 358.
65. M. M. Alaix, No sin desconfianza en mis propias fuerzas me propongo refutar la
carta que el señor Julio Arboleda ha publicado en el numero 9.o de “El Misóforo” [no title
listed, this is ﬁrst line of the text] (Popayán: no press listed, 1850), 54.
66. Mercado, Memorias, xcv.
67. Boletín Democrático (Cali), 12 July 1851. President López made similar claims
in a speech around the same time, citing all the achievements of his reign, including
abolition. José Hilario López, Proclama. El Presidente de la República a sus conciudadanos
(Bogotá: Imprenta del Neo-Granadino, 1851); El Pueblo (Popayán), 1 Sept. 1850.
68. J. N. Montero to Secretary of Government (national), Barbacoas, 10 May
1852, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 179, p. 243.
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money and supplies to support the troops ﬁghting the Conservatives in Pasto
and Obando Provinces.69
Liberal volunteers quickly assembled as rumors of the revolt spread.
When the call went out to defend the government, the response was quick: two
thousand men assembled in Cali, six hundred in Palmira, ﬁve hundred in Santander, and two hundred in Celandia.70 The areas where Afro-Colombians
lived — areas where the zurriago had raged and where Liberals’ promises regarding the ending of slavery, monopolies, and traditional power relations held
the most appeal—provided the most volunteers. Mercado noted that the “Democratic Societies serve as the base for the organization of the national guards.”71
Liberal armies easily defeated the rebels and then sent soldiers north to put
down the revolt in the neighboring region of Antioquia.72 Even Conservatives
had to acknowledge the Liberals’ success at securing popular support; one
diarist noted that the government could rely “on the proletarian classes that it
has perverted.”73
Congress ﬁnally passed the law that would end slavery on 1 January 1852
(the children of slaves were released from their masters’ control on 17 April
1852), which sealed the bargain between their party and Afro-Colombians.74
Liberals did not risk subtlety when they informed the freedpeople to whom
they owed thanks for their liberty. At a ceremony in Almaguer, a local ofﬁcial
noted that “there could not be a true Republic where slavery exists.” He went
on to ask the crowd, “Who is it that made you equal before the law? The government, the democratic government of Nueva Granada.”75 In Barbacoas,
thousands gathered for a ceremony of mass emancipation. Governor Montero
told those assembled that they owed their respect to the “citizen general José
Hilario López who had fought so tenaciously and with such dedication to

69. Ibid.; J. N. Montero to Secretary of Foreign Relations, Barbacoas, 7 Jan.
1852, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 179, p. 171.
70. El Hurón (Popayán), 1 May 1851; Mercado, Memorias, lxxi; Manuel A. Tello
to Provincial Governor, Quilichao, 27 Apr. 1851, ACC, AM, paquete 50, leg. 50.
71. Mercado, Memorias, lxxiii; see also Carlos Gómez to Secretary of
Government (national), Buga, 20 Apr. 1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 216, p. 491.
72. Boletín Democrático, 18 July 1851; Mercado, Memorias, lxxxvi–ix; Bosch, Reseña
histórica, 43 – 44.
73. Anonymous, “Diario de la guerra de 1851,” ACC, FA, sig. 988.
74. López, Proclama, 1; J. N. Montero to Secretary of Foreign Relations,
Barbacoas, 22 June 1852, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 179, p. 159.
75. Vicente Camilo Fontal to Co-Citizens, Almaguer, 1 Jan. 1852, ACC, AM,
paquete 53, leg. 77.
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assure for them their liberty and to return to them their rights as free men.”
Montero continued, “A prolonged shout, as if with one voice, propelled through
the air by a gathering of around three thousand souls, proved very well how
deeply the sentiment of gratitude has been established in all hearts and how
one ﬁnds everyone disposed to the defense and sustenance of the government
under whose regime they obtained the long-dreamed-of good of liberty.” The
ceremony ended with “vivas” to liberty, the president, and the governor.76
Afro-Colombians did acknowledge the role of the Liberals in emancipation. Some ex-slaves and their relatives wrote to President López to ask for a
pardon for Montero when he was tried for abuses of ofﬁce during his term.
They noted how Montero had supported them and, when they were still slaves,
used the law to protect them when he could — to the point of poisoning his
relations with “our masters.” They claimed that he always supported the “poor
and helpless in defense of their rights.” However, they opened their letter with
a powerful appeal to López (and to Liberals in general): “You have worked
arduously, and due to your efforts the most degraded part of society, that today
represents itself to you, has obtained the possession of liberty that we now
enjoy. Your name, now sacred for us, will pass into posterity blessed and pronounced by the tender lips of our children as the benefactor of their parents.”77
Later, even Conservatives would acknowledge that many Caucanos fought in
the 1851 war to ensure slavery would end.78 Indeed, perhaps one way to view
Afro-Colombians’ participation in the zurriago and the 1851 civil war is as a
successful slave revolt. Although we may not be able to recover their true
mindset, it is evident that the popular project to end slavery existed within the
framework of the negotiated alliance between elite and popular liberals.79
76. J. N. Montero to Secretary of Foreign Relations, Barbacoas, 7 Jan. 1852,
AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 179, p. 171.
77. The undersigned, in the majority ex-slaves and residents of the cantón [over
ﬁve hundred names, all but a few signed for by others] to Citizen President of the
Republic, Barbacoas, 6 Nov. 1852, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 179, p. 341.
78. El Cauca (Cali), 19 Nov. 1857; José H. López, “Mensaje del Presidente de la
Nueva Granada al Congreso Constitucional de 1852,” Bogotá, 1 Mar. 1852, AC, 1852,
Cámara, Correspondencia Oﬁcial II, p. 132.
79. There is an important tension in subaltern studies between ﬁnding better
ways to access subaltern histories and the recognition of the limits of such
scholarship. This question seems most concerned with “private” subaltern
consciousness. However, I offer that it is of equal historical import what subalterns
actually said and did in the public sphere. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the
Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and
Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988), 271– 313.
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This bond between popular and elite liberalism, forged in the struggle for
abolition, would endure until the 1870s. Popular liberals also pushed for suffrage and legal recognition of their citizenship rights, although they had already asserted their de facto standing as citizens.80 Liberals removed property
and literacy restrictions on male suffrage in 1853, hoping (as expressed by
the priest Alaix) to capitalize on their alliance with the popular classes. AfroCaucanos regularly exercised their right to vote (which was striking when compared with many parts of the Atlantic World at this time) in the coming
decades.81 Popular liberals also assembled on election days to protect their
comrades from intimidation and fraud, to taunt Conservatives, to cheer their
candidates, and generally to enjoy the holiday.82 Conservatives claimed that
blacks and mulattos voted multiple times, since the elections ofﬁcers could not
tell them apart; one Conservative ruefully commented that his party lost an
election due to “1,600 black votes.”83
However, although unrestricted adult male suffrage beneﬁted Liberals in
the long run, in the short run the party experienced a severe crisis. They began
to suffer electoral defeats due to their unpopularity among many segments of
the lower classes, especially smallholders and Indians. A new, confusing civil
war in 1854 cost them their hold on national and regional power. Some scholars imply that liberalism lost its (short-lived) popular focus after 1854, when an
unusual military coup by a group of Liberals against their own government in
Bogotá divided the party. One wing sided with the Conservatives, who retook
national power. Supposedly, these Liberals supported the Conservative reaction out of fear of popular radicalism.84 Certainly, in the Cauca, Conservative
80. Over two hundred residents of Cali to Members of the Electoral Junta, Cali,
14 May 1848, AHMC, tomo 101, p. 681; We the undersigned, residents of Cali to
President and Members of the Town Council, Cali, 1 Dec. 1851, AHMC, tomo 113,
p. 496.
81. José M. Correa to Tomás C. de Mosquera, Roldanillo, 9 Apr. 1859, ACC,
SM, doc. 36,291; Pedro José Piedrahíta to T. C. de Mosquera, Cali, 26 Feb. 1859,
ACC, SM, doc. 36,921; José Tello to Provincial Governor, Almaguer, 11 Oct. 1853,
ACC, AM, paquete 55, leg. 94; Tomás M. Mosquera to Tomás C. de Mosquera,
Buenosaires, 17 Feb. 1859, ACC, SM, doc. 36,666; El Demócrata: Organo del Partido
Liberal Independiente (Palmira), 13 Mar. 1879.
82. Rafael Prado Concha to Sergio Arboleda, Palmira, 5 Nov. 1871, ACC, FA,
sig. 1523; Los Principios (Cali), 12 Nov. 1875.
83. Pedro José Piedrahíta to T. C. de Mosquera, Cali, 12 Mar. 1859, ACC, SM,
doc. 36,922.
84. This may well have been the case in Bogotá, but the implicit suggestion in
various works is that a similar explanation holds for all of Colombia. Pacheco, La
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armies took advantage of this situational alliance with Liberals opposed to the
coup in order to reassert their social mastery over the region. They engaged in
a vicious slaughter to exact revenge for the zurriago and their defeat in 1851
and tried to restore the pre-1848 exclusion of Afro-Colombians from public
politics. A Conservative army took control of the valley, brutally persecuting
and killing hundreds of popular liberals, especially the Afro-Colombians seen
as responsible for the zurriago.85 As one Conservative wrote to Sergio Arboleda, “I do not regret the disorder in the Cauca, because it is only thus that this
poor country can be cleaned so that it will be inhabitable in the future.”86
Unlike in early-twentieth-century Cuba, Conservatives did not compete with
Liberals for black and mulatto support. Rather, they violently sought to restrict
Afro-Colombians from public life.87
But there is little evidence that most elite Liberals in the Cauca were
reacting against popular participation in politics. On the whole, most Caucano
Liberals seemed confused and ill informed about events in distant Bogotá.
Many supported the elected Liberal government against the coup, even if that
meant aligning with Conservatives. Others supported the coup, especially after
Conservatives rose up against it. Popular liberals, on the whole, were as confused as their elite allies, unsure of what side to support (although when a Conservative army moved on Cali, many Afro-Colombians mobilized to defend the
city, which Conservatives used to justify their persecutions).88 When many
Liberals realized that Conservatives had used the revolt to retake control of
local politics and attack popular liberals, they angrily expressed regret and frustration with the outcome of the war.89 Elite liberals tried their best to restrict
fiesta liberal en Cali, 170 – 91; Fabio Zambrano, “Algunas formas de sociabilidad en la
Nueva Granada, 1780 –1860” (unpublished ms.), 164 –74; Gutiérrez Sanín, Curso y
discurso; Hans-Joachim König, En el camino hacia la nación: Nacionalismo en el proceso de
formación del estado y de la nacíon de la Nueva Granada, 1750 a 1856 (Bogotá: Banco de
la República, 1994), 493 – 502; Safford and Palacios, Colombia, 208 –15.
85. José M. Cañadas to José Hilario López, Cali, 25 Sept. 1854, AGN, SACH,
FJHL, caja 9, carpeta 7, p. 172; Rafael Guzmán to José Hilario López, Pasto, 22 Oct.
1854, AGN, SACH, FJHL, caja 9, carpeta 8, p. 260; Safford and Palacios, Colombia,
212 –14.
86. Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Pasto, 31 Aug. 1854, ACC, FA, sig. 1505.
87. Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in
Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2001), 60 – 66.
88. José J. Lemos to Provincial Governor, Silvia, 30 May 1854, ACC, AM,
paquete 75, leg. 84.
89. José de Obaldía to José Hilario López, Ibagué, 18 Oct. 1854, AGN, SACH,
FJHL, caja 9, carpeta 8, p. 249; La Unión (Popayán), 7 Feb. 1864.
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Conservatives’ depredations, but with their party divided, there was little they
could do. Conservatives, however, soon found themselves on the defensive
once again. Afro-Colombian rebels roamed the countryside, preventing a return
to the order that Conservatives sought. Popular liberalism was not forgotten
on the haciendas, where Conservatives, even with resort to judicial authority
and extrajudicial violence, found it almost impossible to control the ex-slave
labor force.90
The cruelest blow to Conservative pretensions came from one of their
own — ex-president Tomás Mosquera, now head of the state government. The
ambitious Mosquera wished to place himself back in the presidential ofﬁce
controlled by Conservative Mariano Ospina. He sought to gather regional
support for his efforts in the Cauca, but most Conservatives did not look kindly
at a revolt against their own party. Mosquera, however, was not deterred. He
bolted from the Conservatives, creating his new “National Party,” and began to
court the Cauca’s popular classes, including popular liberals (although his early
efforts, as expressed by Juan Aparicio’s lament, were unsuccessful). Mosquera
made these overtures by removing harsh vagrancy laws, put in place after 1854
by triumphant Conservatives, and promised to secure Cali’s ejidos for use by
the poor.91 In Buga, Cali, and Palmira, popular liberalism arose anew, and
Conservatives worried that the “democráticas” had returned. Although it
seems the clubs were not ofﬁcially reestablished under that moniker, meetings
were taking place in Cali, Palmira, Buga, and Popayán, and old connections
were being reforged.92 Conservatives fretted that Liberals had formed “latent
democráticas organized with the title republican juntas” in all the towns of any
size in the Cauca.93 In Cartago, Conservatives had organized a society to work

90. Hacendados endlessly complained about the lack of discipline of their labor
force. See Sergio Arboleda, “Observaciones á la cuenta formada por los Sres. Rafael y
Daniel Arboleda,” Bogotá, 30 Aug. 1878, ACC, FA, sig. 15, p. 1; Sergio Arboleda,
“Instrucciones al Señor Trinidad Gómez para el manejo de la hacienda Quintero,”
Japio, 4 Sept. 1857, ACC, FA, sig. 140, p. 7.
91. T. C. de Mosquera to President of the Senate, Popayán, 2 Sept. 1859, ACC,
AM, paquete 74, leg. 56; Gaceta del Cauca (Popayán), 6 Sept. 1859; T. C. de
Mosquera, “Mensaje del Gobernador del Estado a la Lejislatura de 1859,” Popayán,
11 Aug. 1859, ACC, AM, paquete 74, leg. 48.
92. Pedro Antonio Martínez Cuellar to Mariano Ospina, Buga, 27 June 1859,
BN, FM, libro 210, p. 32; José V. López to Mariano Ospina, Cali, 3 June 1859, BN,
FM, libro 210, p. 132.
93. José M. Chicaíza to Mariano Ospina, Pasto, 7 June 1859, BN, FM, libro 322,
p. 374.
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in the recent elections; Liberals responded with their own club, which one
Conservative claimed was made up almost entirely of “blacks” to whom the
Liberals had distributed weapons.94 By July 1859, the Democratic Society in
Cali had ofﬁcially reorganized.95 Thus, the loss in the 1854 war was not a fundamental break in Caucano Liberals’ relation to the lower classes but, rather, a
temporary (if bloody) setback. Liberals, now led by Mosquera, were ready to
bargain with their popular allies again.
While Mosquera schemed and studied the chances of a revolt against
Ospina, he received an extraordinary petition from Cali. Over 750 men signed
or made their mark, asking that Mosquera assign Cali’s provincial governorship to a young professor named David Peña. Peña was a Liberal ﬁrebrand who
was well known for his oratory, immensely popular with Cali’s lower classes,
and most likely a mulatto. Peña, the petition argued, would enjoy great support
and be able to carry out “the ideas of progress and of social welfare,” which was
probably understood as dealing with taxes and land distribution. The petitioners made an offer to Mosquera: “We will accompany him [Peña] in danger, and
when you, Citizen Governor, need the residents of Cali province, you will ﬁnd
more than two thousand soldiers resolved to sacriﬁce themselves in defense of
the State.”96 Mosquera named Peña the current governor’s designated substitute and moved himself further into the Liberal fold and a curious alliance with
the popular classes, who had promised to provide him troops in his planned
rebellion.
Mosquera entered into revolt in 1860, and as they had in 1851, AfroColombians ﬂocked to the Liberal banner, led by the recomposed Democratic
Societies.97 The 1860 – 63 war was long and bloody, much different from the
previous two civil wars. But at least at the beginning, Afro-Colombians were
eager participants. Conservatives complained that Liberals enticed troops to
join their ranks by promising to allow looting of Conservative haciendas and
farms — a rich possibility given popular liberals’ desire to break the haciendas’
94. J. M. Bustamente to Mariano Ospina, Cartago, 15 Sept. 1859, BN, FM, libro
210, p. 97.
95. David Peña, President of the Democratic Society to State Governor, Cali, 19
July 1859, ACC, SM, doc. 36,899.
96. Residents of Cali Province [over 750 names, many signed for by others] to
Governor of the State, Cali, 30 July 1859, ACC, AM, paquete 71, leg. 15.
97. “Diario Histórico del Ejército Unido de Antioquia y Cauca,” ACC, FA, sig.
63, p. 235; Manuel José González to Sergio Arboleda, Cali, 11 Mar. 1862, ACC, FA,
sig. 437, p. 1; Daniel Mosquera to Provincial Governor, Tambo, 18 Aug. 1861, ACC,
AM, paquete 82, leg. 27.
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control over land. During the war, Federalists (Liberals) expropriated the mammoth haciendas of the Conservative Arboledas, Japio and Quintero. Sergio
Arboleda claimed that some Liberals planned “to distribute them by lots between
the members of the army that had served in certain campaigns.”98 Perhaps it is
needless to say that this massive and radical land redistribution program was
not carried out, but at least some Liberals had proposed it.
Their victory in the 1860 – 63 civil war heralded almost two decades of
Liberal rule in the Cauca, during which the party relied on its lower-class allies
for electoral and military support.99 Conservatives tried to revolt again in 1865
but were handily defeated. An even more prolonged and sanguinary war erupted
in 1876, but once again the Democratic Societies rose to defend the Liberal
Party from Conservative rebellion.100 Liberals remained in control not just on
the battleﬁeld but also at the ballot box. Liberals dominated local elections,
sometimes through fraud, but also with the support of many Afro-Colombians
on election day.101 Conservatives complained that with “universal suffrage” the
intelligent and propertied classes were losing to the “democratic masses.”102
98. El Espectador: Dios, Relijion i Libertad (Pasto), 10 Apr. 1862; rough draft of a
letter to the national congress, [Sergio Arboleda], [mid-1860s?], ACC, FA, sig. 180,
p. 4.
99. While the alliance between popular and elite liberals was strong in the
central valley, it withered along the coast. Partly this was due to the lack of a
committed Liberal leadership; after the popular governor J. N. Montero left, no other
leader emerged to mobilize Afro-Colombians. The remaining Liberals were too tied
to the old mine-owning class and too much concerned with securing labor and
maintaining order to negotiate with Afro-Colombians. Unlike in the Cauca Valley,
Afro-Colombians did not need these Liberals; they had abundant land in the rain
forests and felt little pressure from the powerful, be it for taxes, labor, or deference.
Elite Liberals, also concerned with disciplining a now radically independent labor
force, feared or detested their black neighbors. At least on the coast, racism and racial
fears broke down the alliance that would endure inland. Governor of Atrato Province
to Secretary of the Treasury, Quibdó, 1 Mar. 1859, ACC, AM, paquete 73, leg. 39;
Gaceta Oficial del Cauca (Popayán), 27 Apr. 1867; El Atratense (Quibdó), 9 Sept. and 26
Oct. 1880. See also Claudia Leal, “Natural Treasures and Racial Tensions: The
Paciﬁc Lowlands of Colombia at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century, 1880 –1930”
( paper presented at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas,
2003).
100. In Cali, eight hundred men from the Democratic Society quickly
volunteered. Rafael [Arboleda] to T. C. de Mosquera, Popayán, 14 June 1876, ACC,
SM, doc. 56,924.
101. El Pensamiento Popular, 1 July 1852; José Tello to Provincial Governor,
Almaguer, 11 Oct. 1853, ACC, AM, paquete 55, leg. 94.
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Consternated Conservatives blamed their failures on the votes of “manumitted
blacks” led by “one or two somewhat civilized mulattos.”103 When the new
1863 national constitution gave the states the responsibility of deﬁning suffrage rights, the Cauca’s Liberals retained unrestricted male suffrage.104
Popular liberals’ political participation went beyond the duties of soldiering and voting. Afro-Colombians’ repertoire of politics during this period was
extensive and innovative.105 They did not just cast ballots but also engaged in
electioneering; afterward, they sat in the galleries of local and state legislatures
to remind legislators of their debt to the popular electorate. They participated
in boycotts and strikes, and at times they physically attacked their enemies or
their enemies’ property. They petitioned government ofﬁcials, asking for certain policies or favors or simply expressing their approval. They marched in
demonstrations. In short, Afro-Caucanos continually and constantly made
their presence felt in the region’s political life.106
During this time (as Nancy Appelbaum has shown), the Cauca became
notorious throughout Colombia as a place of disorder and near anarchy, with
impudent workers and armed and dangerous soldiers.107 During the 1860 – 63
civil war, black Caucano army ofﬁcer Manuel María Victoria began to organize
Afro-Panamanians into a Democratic Society; his superiors quickly returned
him to the Cauca.108 In 1865, the Panamá state government refused to allow
Caucano troops to return home by way of the isthmus, presumably for fear that

102. Pedro José Piedrahíta to T. C. de Mosquera, Cali, 12 Mar. 1859, ACC, SM,
doc. 36,922.
103. Pedro José Piedrahíta to T. C. de Mosquera, Cali, 26 Feb. 1859, ACC, SM,
doc. 36,921.
104. Constitución política del Estado Soberano de Cauca, espedida el 16 de septiembre de
1863 (Bogotá: Imprenta de la Nación, 1865).
105. The Afro-Caucanos’ political repertoire matched new nineteenth-century
repertoires in European social movements; Charles Tilly, “Contentious Repertoires in
Great Britain, 1758 –1834,” Social Science History 17 (Summer 1993), 253 – 80.
106. For voting, petitions, boycotts, violence, and demonstrations, see previously
cited material. For the strike, see below. For sitting in the galleries, see C. Conto to
Aquileo Parra, Popayán, 7 Aug. 1877, Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, Bogotá, Sala de
Manuscritos, ms. 295; Bosch, Reseña histórica, 50.
107. Nancy Appelbaum, “Whitening the Region: Caucano Mediation and
‘Antioqueño Colonization’ in Nineteenth-Century Colombia,” Hispanic American
Historical Review 79 ( Nov. 1999): 636 – 45.
108. Gustavo Arboleda, Diccionario biográfico y genealógico del antiguo Departamento
del Cauca (Bogotá: Biblioteca Horizontes, 1962 [1910]), 474.
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they would politically contaminate the local populace.109 The success of popular
claimsmaking in the Cauca, especially by blacks and mulattos, frightened elites
in the rest of Colombia and Conservatives in the Cauca. Afro-Colombians were
so important to Liberals that Conservatives portrayed the party as predominantly “black.” A Conservative, describing Liberal troops in the 1860 – 63 civil
war, wrote, “[T]he greatest part of that army is made up of blacks, zambos, and
mulattos, assassins and thieves of the Cauca Valley.”110 I would hypothesize that
not all of the “blacks” that made up popular liberals were people of African
descent. Popular liberalism became encoded black, at least for Conservatives,
and anyone, especially the mestizo poor, who associated with popular liberalism
also became, to some extent, “black.” Liberal armies had many mestizos and
whites too, but — like popular liberalism — they became “black,” due to the
heavy Afro-Colombian participation in the ranks. This identiﬁcation could even
extend to middle-class leaders like David Peña, who was probably mulatto and
possibly white. In a sense it does not matter, as many thought of him as black
due to his popularity among Afro-Colombians.111
Afro-Caucanos’ extensive, multifaceted political repertoire and their bargaining with the Liberal Party do not seem to ﬁt easily with the caudillo or
patron-client models of nineteenth-century politics. Popular liberals did not ally
with the Liberal Party because of any one charismatic leader or “culture hero.”
Nor was the union “held together by the bond of patron and client”; indeed, in
the Cauca tenants often opposed their hacendados.112 Popular liberals sided with
109. Benjamín Núñez to Secretary of Government, Cali, 6 Dec. 1865, ACC,
AM, paquete 65, leg. 67.
110. “Diario Histórico del Ejército Unido de Antioquia y Cauca,” ACC, FA, sig.
63,235; see also El Espectador, 2 Oct. [1862].
111. In a private letter to Tomás Mosquera, Peña was described as a “belonging
to the African race, a mulatto claro.” Pedro José Piedrahíta to T. C. de Mosquera,
Cali, 14 May 1859, ACC, SM, doc. 36,933. The liberal governor Ramón Mercado,
probably white, has also been described as a mulatto. See Escorcia, Sociedad y
economía, 89. Conservatives at times described all Liberals as acting like “blacks”; see
Alfonso [Arboleda] to Sergio Arboleda, Popayán, 20 Aug. 1879, ACC, FA, sig. 447,
p. 59.
112. “Culture hero” from John Charles Chasteen, Heroes on Horseback: The Life
and Times of the Last Gaucho Caudillos (Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press,
1995), 4. Patron-client quotation from John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America,
1800 –1850 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 4 – 5. See also Hugh M. Hamill, ed., Caudillos:
Dictators in Spanish America ( Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1992). For a very
nuanced presentation of caudillismo that stresses patron-client bonds, material
motivations, emotional ties, but also party identiﬁcation, see Ariel de la Fuente,
Children of Facundo: Caudillo and Gaucho Insurgency during the Argentine State-Formation

Popular Liberalism and Race in Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia

303

elite Liberals because they saw in that alliance their best chance to further their
political, economic, and social ambitions. Popular liberals allied not with individuals (as in the caudillo or patron-client model) but with the party and its
ideas, and this alliance was merely mediated, and not embodied, by leaders
such as David Peña. Liberal leaders could not just command support, and popular liberals did not blindly offer their services or only march to war as cannon
fodder.113 While John Lynch notes that caudillos relied on “personal inﬂuence
and timely intimidation,” Cauca Liberals had to negotiate for military and electoral support, offering concessions on slavery, land, monopolies, suffrage rights,
and, most important, citizenship.114 Republican bargaining not only helps us
understand popular motivations but also pushes the social and political history
of subaltern groups into the narrative of Colombian political history.
Bolstered by their popular allies, Liberals dominated the Cauca, and due
to their inﬂuence in civil wars, national politics. As long as they were not internally divided, popular and elite liberals were unbeatable. Caucano armies, largely
made up of popular liberals (many, if not most, Afro-Colombians), had a power
that Conservatives simply could not match. Conservatives courted their own
popular allies, but, for a variety of reasons, these popular conservatives were
Process (La Rioja, 1853 –1870) (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2000). Caudillismo may
well be the best explanatory guide for certain times and places, but it seems of less
utility for understanding nineteenth-century Colombia. For example, Charles Walker
notes the limited political campaigning in the Peruvian countryside in his study of
caudillismo, compared to the intense political life I found in rural Colombia. Charles
F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780 –1840
(Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1999). While the caudillo model has been superceded by
some scholars working on urban history, it is more accepted for rural areas. See
Sowell, The Early Colombian Labor Movement. While the caudillo model may limit too
severely subaltern agency, focusing on resistance alone may ignore the vast majority
of popular political participation. For resistance in the Cauca, see Michael T. Taussig,
The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 1980).
113. For views that emphasize clientelism, see Alvaro Tirado Mejía, Aspectos
sociales de las guerras civiles en Colombia (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura,
1976), 37 – 38; Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, 94; Orlando Fals Borda,
Historia doble de la costa, vol. 2 (Bogotá: Carlos Valencia, 1981), 62b–76b, 191. For
opinions closer to my own, see Malcolm Deas, “Poverty, Civil War, and Politics:
Ricardo Gaitán Obeso and his Magdalena River Campaign in Colombia, 1885,” Nova
Americana 2 (1979): 263 – 303; and Rebecca Earle, ed., Rumours of Wars: Civil Conflict
in Nineteenth-Century Latin America (London: Institute of Latin American Studies,
2000).
114. Lynch, Caudillos, 4.
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not as committed to or involved in the Conservative Party at this time. When
Conservatives tried to revolt, as they had in 1851, they would suffer defeat at
the hands of (in the words of Cali’s Democratic Society) “thousands of liberal
citizens armed in defense of the endangered Patria.”115
The Meanings of Citizenship

What did popular liberals understand “liberal citizens” to mean? Elite Liberals saw citizenship as a new universal identity that would supercede other relations in society, an identity they could use to shape the lower classes into disciplined, orderly workers under elite leadership.116 However, liberal citizenship
appealed to popular groups, and especially Afro-Colombians, for distinct reasons. It provided Afro-Colombians with a new public and political identity that
they lacked in the aftermath of the “social death” of slavery. Liberal citizenship
in the Cauca demanded no special identity, history, or property (indeed, it
demanded these past identities be left behind) beyond a willingness to support
the Liberal cause. This deﬁnition alienated other segments of the popular
classes, including Indians and Antioqueño mestizo migrants, who were devoted
to their traditional customs, identities, and properties. It greatly appealed,
however, to Afro-Colombians. Conservatives asserted that “blacks” were “ignorant men” who only plotted rebellion and did not “merit the title of true
Granadans.”117 They derided blacks as “an ignorant and bestial race.”118 Yet, as
Alaix noted, popular liberals reacted to this racism and exclusion by embracing
the notion of citizenship.
Liberals’ vision of society encouraged Afro-Colombians’ role in politics.
While Liberals denigrated Indians, they rarely publicly (and for many not even
privately) spoke of race.119 Certainly, Liberals had not yet felt the full force of
115. Boletín Democrático, 18 July 1851.
116. Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century
British Liberal Thought (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999). For Colombian
liberalism generally, see Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El pensamiento colombiano en el siglo
XIX (Bogotá: Temis, 1964); Gerardo Molina, Las ideas liberales en Colombia, vol. 1,
1849 –1914 (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1988).
117. Francisco González to Provincial Governor, Santander, 20 Mar. 1855, ACC,
AM, paquete 60, leg. 60.
118. José V. López to Mariano Ospina, Cali, 21 May 1859, BN, FM, libro 210,
p. 129.
119. Some Liberals claimed that races did not (or should not) really exist, all
people were basically the same, and society should forget about divisions based on
“ridiculous accidents.” El Montañes (Barbacoas), 15 Feb. 1876.
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scientiﬁc racism coming from the North Atlantic, and their reliance on the
identity of citizen enabled some Liberals to elide the problem of race. No doubt
many Liberals were racist, but they viewed racial problems as rooted in culture,
a problem of the discipline of the racially mixed lower classes that would be
solved through education and discipline: schools, ceremonies, the national guard,
jails, and the Democratic Societies.120 I cannot fully explore Caucano liberalism’s racial imaginary in this article, but I suggest that — at least before the
1870s — Liberals had no problem recruiting blacks and mulattos into their
party and, at least regarding slavery, fought tenaciously to improve their compatriots’ lives. While scholars can trawl through liberal writings to ﬁnd examples of racism or contempt for the lower classes, what is surprising is how much
Cauca Liberals relied on their lower-class allies, including them in the public
community of the nation not only in discourse but also, surprisingly, in practice (although in a subordinate role). The discourses and practices of liberalism
and republicanism thus allowed Afro-Colombians an entrée into the public,
political realm.121
Afro-Colombians eagerly seized on the new public identity of “citizen” to
replace their old identity as slaves. Former slaves of the San Julián hacienda
noted that “since we ceased to depend on the man that they called our master,
and we entered, due to the majesty of the law, into the category of free men,”
the leaders of the town of Caloto continued to harass them, assigning them
unfair duties and taxes. The Afro-Caucanos declared that Caloto’s parochial
government “wanted to convert us into slaves again, of a worse nature than
what we were before.”122 Similarly, José Tomás del Carmen complained that his
eight-year-old daughter had been forced into domestic service for another
family, violating his “rights” and returning him to a “worse condition than when
we were slaves.”123

120. La Unión, 7 Feb. 1864.
121. These discourses of republicanism and liberalism acted in the Cauca much
the way “myths” of racial democracy and republicanism acted in Cuba to provide
possibilities for the mobilization of Afro-Cubans. See Alejandro de la Fuente, “Myths
of Racial Democracy: Cuba, 1900 –1912,” Latin American Research Review 34, no. 3
(1999): 39 –73.
122. Inhabitants of the San Julián Hacienda [over 25 names, all but a few signed
for by another] to Governor of the Province, San Julián, 15 Oct. 1853, ACC, AM,
paquete 55, leg. 92. References to slavery appeared in numerous petitions and letters
from this period.
123. José Tomás del Carmen [written by another] to Governor, Popayán, 16
Mar. 1855, ACC, AM, paquete 60, leg. 60.
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Obviously, Afro-Colombians sought to prevent their return to slavery,
perhaps the overarching goal of their discourse and politics. They abhorred
not only legal slavery but also servile conditions similar to slavery (after all,
most Afro-Caucanos had never been slaves): a lack of control over their lives,
the arbitrary power of the master, and the absence of liberty and equality. A
Conservative ofﬁcial noted, when he described former slaves’ attitudes to a
new tax, that they are convinced “they are oppressed, that they are tyrannized,
and that through these means [the taxes] we want to return them to slavery,
which is the magic word that they employ in these situations.”124 For AfroCaucanos, slavery was indeed a “magic word,” evoking the nightmare against
which they constructed their vision of popular liberalism.
In the identity of the citizen Afro-Colombians found a corrective to
counter their old positions as slaves. From the coastal village of San Juan, exslaves wrote to thank the national Congress: “[D]ue to the philanthropy of the
citizens that compose the Honorable House and Senate, we enjoy the precious
possession of liberty, so long usurped, and with it all the other rights and prerogatives of citizens.”125 The residents of the San Julián hacienda not only
noted that they were “free men” who should not be treated as slaves but also
asserted their new status in the opening line as “inhabitants of the San Julián
hacienda to which once we belonged as slaves, before you in the use of our
rights as citizens.”126 The petitioners contrasted their former condition with
their new identity as not just citizens, but citizens with rights.
The idea that citizenship protected against the abuses of slavery did not
disappear easily. The Afro-Colombian boatmen of the river Dagua, who ferried passengers and goods from the Paciﬁc Coast to the central valley, claimed
their place as citizens in a labor strike in 1878: “We should be treated like citizens of a Republic and not like the slaves of a sultan.”127 A quarter of a century
124. Bautista Feijoo, Jefe Político of Torres Cantón to Governor of the Province,
Caloto, 8 Apr. 1854, ACC, AM, paquete 75, leg. 84. Years later, a liberal observer
noted how a severe famine in the valley had forced those desperate for food to beg by
saying “the hated word, my master”; La Voz del Pueblo: Organo de la Sociedad
Democrática (Cali), 3 Oct. 1878.
125. Residents of San Juan [24 names, all signed with an X] to Citizen Senators
and Representatives (national), no place or date on letter, but 1852, AC, 1852,
Senado, Proyectos Negados II, p. 19.
126. Inhabitants of the San Julián Hacienda (over 25 names, all but a few signed
for by another) to Governor of the Province, San Julián, 15 Oct. 1853, ACC, AM,
paquete 55, leg. 92.
127. The bogas of the Dagua River (over 115 names, all but 7 signed for by
others) to Citizen President of the State, Cali, 15 May 1878, ACC, AM, paquete 144,
leg. 64.
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after emancipation, Afro-Caucanos still knew the power of the metaphor of
slavery. For them, citizenship meant never returning to that degraded position.
Afro-Colombians’ rights and liberty had long been denied, but the new identity of the citizen guaranteed their place in the social body.
How did popular liberals think they earned citizenship? For elite Liberals,
rational thought was the determinant for citizenship. For Conservatives, it
depended on history and social location. For Afro-Colombians, the key to citizenship lay in the defense of the political community (be it the entire nation or
the Liberal Party) against the efforts of bad citizens to undermine and harm it.
That is, service to the party earned one the title of citizen. Former slaves and
tenants in Quilcacé reminded state ofﬁcials of what the nation owed them for
their past support, recalling “the services the village made to the cause of the
federation [in the 1860–63 war] and due to the bloody sufferings that it endured
because of its adherence to that cause.”128 By the 1860s, the cause of federalism
was more or less synonymous with liberalism in the Cauca. The Quilcasereños,
like many Afro-Caucanos, fought in the 1860 – 63 civil war and now called
upon the Liberal state to protect them in a land dispute.
In 1878 local conservatives in Caldas municipality accused former liberal
soldiers from areas including Quilcacé and the Afro-Caucano-dominated area
of Patía of banditry. The accused wrote to the Liberal state president to remind
him of their past loyalty: “You know, Citizen President, what are the causes
that motivate the said charges [of banditry], since one of them is [our] having
sustained in the civil war of ’76 and ’77 the dignity of the Government, of the
Cauca, and of the rule of the Constitution of the Republic.”129 Not only had
these popular liberals not received any reward for their sacriﬁces for the Liberal cause, but they now also faced punishment as a result of their fealty. This
must have seemed the cruelest of treacheries — to be hounded by the same
Conservatives they had defeated in war.
The Dagua boatmen cited their partisanship in the 1876 –77 civil war as
well. “In our profession we have lent great services to the liberal cause, and
more than a few times we have set aside the punting poles and oars in order to
take up the gun . . . , serving in every way possible the liberal cause, the cause of

128. Residents of Quilcacé Aldea (over 80 names) to Municipal Vocales,
Quilcacé, 14 Feb. 1864, ACC, AM, paquete 88, leg. 54.
129. Pioquinto Diago, for himself and in the name of his friends (nine others,
written by someone else as the petitioners were illiterate) to Citizen President of
the Sovereign State of Cauca, Popayán, 7 Feb. 1878, ACC, AM, paquete 144,
leg. 64.
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our sympathies.”130 Even though the Conservatives had threatened them during the war, ordering them to ferry supplies up the river, the boatmen had
refused. Afro-Colombians had little to offer the Liberal Party in terms of
wealth and social inﬂuence — all they had was their willingness to support the
party with their votes or with their blood. Therefore, the armed citizen became
the political actor of popular liberalism.131
Afro-Caucanos did not just accept the deﬁnition of citizenship posited by
Liberals; they appropriated and reframed the concept. Of course, before 1853
most Afro-Colombians did not meet the property and literacy requirements
for full legal citizenship. This did not stop them, however, from seizing the
mantle of citizen anyway. They joined the Democratic Societies, participated
in political rallies and demonstrations, and took up arms in the national guard.
They even participated in elections. If before 1853 the state forbade them from
voting, they nevertheless could arrive on election day, wait in the plaza, cheer
their compatriots, and with their presence make it known that they would
respond forcefully to any fraud. They seized their rights by knocking down the
fences of haciendas that blocked their access to land and by punishing those
Conservatives whom they saw as attempting to destroy the citizen body. They
themselves became judges of who was a citizen and who was not.132 The
“other” against which Afro-Caucanos constructed their citizenship was both
slavery (which citizenship countered) and all the forces that sought to rob them
of citizenship and its prerogatives. Most powerfully, the slave master personiﬁed this “other,” but so too did the aristocrat, the powerful, the hacendado, the
Conservative, or simply the rich.133
130. The bogas of the Dagua River (over 115 names, all but 7 signed for by
others) to Citizen President of the State, Cali, 15 May 1878, ACC, AM, paquete 144,
leg. 64.
131. The focus on military service and voting had the effect of excluding
women —who often participated in direct political action — from full membership in
popular liberalism and nation formation. For the importance of military service, see
Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 37 – 42; Doris Sommer, Foundational Fictions: The National
Romances of Latin America (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991), 23.
132. Mercado acknowledged this when he referred to the people who knocked
down fences in Cali’s ejidos as “citizens.” R. Mercado to Secretary of Government,
Cali, 24 Jan. 1851, AGN, SR, FGV, tomo 165, p. 799.
133. Anonymous, Observaciones para servir a la historia, 1; El Pensamiento Popular,
22 July 1852; Jorge J. Hoyos to Mariano Ospina, Buenaventura, 25 Mar. 1859, BN,
FM, libro 189, p. 363; Ariete, 19 Jan. 1850; Residents of Tumaco (over 45 names) to
Citizen President of the Union, Tumaco, 30 Aug. 1878, Archivo del Instituto
Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria, Bogotá, Bienes Nacionales (hereafter cited as
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However, Afro-Colombians’ redeﬁnition of citizenship involved much more
than appropriating control over who could be citizens and why. Popular liberals
also imagined citizenship’s rights and meanings distinctly. Most importantly,
they invested citizenship with much more powerful notions of liberty and equality than their elite allies recognized. Afro-Colombians deﬁned citizenship as not
just the absence of legal slavery but also the absence of the economic and social
subordination slavery entailed. Conservatives were aghast at Afro-Colombians’
claim to citizenship and refusal to accept older forms of deference. However,
even more worrisome was popular liberals’ insistence that citizenship carried
with it rights to economic equality — speciﬁcally, the right to the land. Land
had been one of the central concerns of the zurriago, and land questions —
either protection of commons or possible redistribution — had motivated popular liberals in various civil wars.
By the late 1860s, popular liberals more vociferously expounded a radical
discourse concerning land rights. In 1868 the Palmira Democratic Society
petitioned the national government on behalf of their poor constituents. Local
hacendados had forbidden them to gather ﬁrewood and were trying to force
them to pay rents on marginal land bordering the haciendas. The Democratic
Society claimed that those marginal lands did not belong to the hacendados
and that the poor had a “natural right” to exploit such lands. The petitioners
noted that the nation was in a “glorious era of natural equality . . . with the fall
and overturning of all those tyrannies of which the weak have been victims,
here as everywhere; [land] is the exclusive beneﬁt of a few, who present themselves as powerful, and usurp everything and exploit the weak, from their essential individual rights to the free gifts that God has apportioned, with muniﬁcent profusion in favor of all of his children.”134 The use of the land was a
natural right given by God to the poor, a right that perhaps overrode questions
of legal title. The Palmira Democratic Society did not rely on natural rights or
appeals to religion alone to justify their claims. The Society reminded the president that “the poor class” had made “the very valuable contribution of their
blood in order to defend our institutions, public order, and national indepen-

INCORA), tomo 14, p. 947; Manuel María [Mosquera] to Tomás [Cipriano
Mosquera], Popayán, 15 May 1877, ACC, SM, doc. 57,555; Gutiérrez Sanín, Curso y
discurso.
134. The undersigned Colombian citizens and active members of the Sovereign
State of Cauca and the Democratic Society of Palmira (over 65 names) to Citizen
President of the United States of Colombia, Palmira, 21 June 1868, INCORA, tomo
7, p. 492.
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dence and integrity.” They continued, “These individuals have, at the very
least, an unquestionable right to be protected by a liberal government.”135
The 1876 –77 civil war, which produced the largest battles in the Cauca
since independence, encouraged popular liberals to push their visions further.
The blood they had sacriﬁced to the Liberal cause, saving their party from
almost certain defeat, demanded payment, and land — as with abolition during
the 1851 war —was the reward for which they clamored.136 Cali’s Democratic
Society sent a petition to the state president demanding remuneration for all
the services Cali’s poor had lent to the Liberal cause in the past war, citing their
many battles in the long campaign. First they asked for back pay, rations, and
pensions for the widows and orphans of their fallen comrades. Then they came
to their most pointed demand: an end to land rents. They proposed that anyone could settle and farm any land in Cauca as long as it did not “gravely harm
another.” They also asked that all forests be open to the poor to gather ﬁrewood as needed. They acknowledged that their petition might seem extraordinary, but cautioned, “How can one think it just that those who have come every
time to defend this soil that saw them born, against the repeated and unjust
invasions from Antioquia [a Conservative bastion], invasions aided by those
who call themselves owners of the greater part of the Cauca’s land, live without
a home?”137
Of course, claimsmaking for land was not only economic, as landholding
was intricately linked with questions of deference (owed to the landlord) and
representation (the economic independence needed for the status as free citizens in many eyes). Here elite Liberal conceptions of citizenship departed from
the Afro-Caucanos’ popular liberalism. As far as elites were concerned, the citizenship question had already been addressed successfully; however, popular
liberals knew that their status was not secure until they had economic equality.
The soldiers closed their petition with passion, asserting, “[L]and cannot be
occupied to such an extent that the other members of the community are
deprived of the means of subsistence or are obligated to be the slaves of those
feudal lords who do not admit into their supposed properties any but those
individuals who implicitly sell their personal independence, that is to say, their
135. Ibid.; for a similar argument, see El Pensamiento Popular, 22 July 1852.
136. Carlos Holguín to Sergio Arboleda, Manizales, 30 Jan. 1877, ACC, FA, sig.
1515; Belisario Zamorano, Bosquejo biográfico del Jeneral David Peña (Cali: Imprenta de
Eustaquio Palacios, 1878), 16.
137. The undersigned members of the Democratic Society (over 180 names,
many with very rough handwriting or signed for by others) to Citizen President of
the State, Cali, 1 June 1877, ACC, AM, paquete 137, leg. 7.
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conscience and liberty, in order to be the peons and tributaries of an individual
and to cease to be citizens of a free people.”138 David Peña wrote the proposed
law, ﬁrst calling for a ﬁve-year moratorium on all rents and, more radically,
allowing those without land to claim up to three hectares of any land that was
not fenced or cultivated by another. The law also demanded that the poor have
access to any unfenced forests to take wood as they needed.139
After much consternation (for elite Liberals knew the petitioners had
saved the party in the war), they rejected the land claims as too expensive and
illegal.140 Elite Liberals thought they were simply rejecting an economic claim.
For popular liberals, however, this rejection of the land law struck at the whole
apparatus of social bargaining, since owning land affected not just their economic livelihoods but also their social and political status as a free people. One
goal of this essay has been to show how popular liberals’ bargaining in the
Cauca opened possibilities for vibrant popular political action. However, I also
would like to stress the limits of this negotiation. Social bargaining between
elite and popular liberals involved four broad categories of rights: judicial,
social, representative, and economic. By the 1870s, Liberals had made great
progress on judicial issues: abolishing the death penalty, limiting imprisonment
to sixteen years, and implementing jury trials. Likewise, much had been done
with social issues. Liberals proudly declared the aristocracy vanquished (even if
true equality had never been achieved), and Afro-Colombians participated
alongside mestizo and white liberals in many aspects of public life, be it in the
Democratic Societies, the national guard, demonstrations, or public ceremonies. In the representative realm, all male adults could vote, many did, and
some were even elected to local ofﬁce. Middle-class Liberals with close ties to
Afro-Colombians (and even some Afro-Colombians themselves) served in higher
ofﬁces, although generally this access was quite limited. Even in the economic
realm, popular liberals had won much — the ending of monopolies on aguardiente and tobacco, support (if not outright victory) in their struggles for the ejidos, payment for military service, and, most importantly, the abolition of slavery (which also involved social, judicial, and representative issues). But elite
138. Ibid.
139. David Peña, “Proyecto de Lei por lo cual se fomenta la agricultura en el
Estado,” Popayán, 9 Aug. 1877, ACC, AM, paquete 137, leg. 30.
140. Registro Oficial (Organo del Gobierno del Cauca) (Popayán), 30 June 1877; B.
González to Julián Trujillo, Popayán, 2 Aug. 1877, AGN, Sección Colecciones,
Fondo Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, Serie Generales y Civiles, caja 94, carpeta 346, doc.
18,565; Report of Ramón Cerón, Popayán, 14 Aug. 1877, ACC, AM, paquete 137,
leg. 30.
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Liberals were not willing or able to satisfy the most central of popular liberals’
economic concerns: land redistribution. Here the class rift between the ideologies of elite liberalism and popular liberalism was too deep. The citizenship
question had been closed for elite Liberals with unrestricted adult male suffrage, but for Afro-Colombians that was only an important opening in their
struggle to truly be “citizens of a free people.”
The failure of elite Liberals to respond to popular demands for land strained
the Afro-Caucano relationship with the Liberal Party. By the late 1870s, the
Cauca’s political scene had changed signiﬁcantly. The disorder of the 1876 –77
civil war and the continual claimsmaking of popular liberals caused many Liberals to reconsider the wisdom of the political alliance they had forged in the
1850s. A faction calling themselves Independents split off from the party; they
hoped, among other things, to restrict popular political participation. When in
1879 the Independents, with Conservative allies, rose up in a coup against the
state government, Liberals tried to marshal the Democratic Societies to save
them one last time, but with the land bill defeated, they had much less success
rallying Afro-Caucanos than before. The Independents took control of the
state, preﬁguring the national process known as the Regeneration, which
replaced Colombia’s liberal and federalist 1863 constitution with the harshly
conservative and centrist 1886 constitution (which would remain basically
intact over the next one hundred years). The new regime persecuted the Democratic Societies, reduced the frequency of elections, instituted tough anticrime
legislation, and restricted national suffrage to property owners. A coalition of
Conservatives, Independents, and some popular groups succeeded in reining in
the public, political space available to plebeians in general and popular liberals
in particular.141
However, Liberals’ retreat from popular engagement should not overshadow Afro-Caucanos’ adeptness at reframing the discourse of liberalism to suit
their needs, nor their ability to negotiate with Liberal Party leaders for some
recognition by the state and nation. I would argue that, in general, nineteenth141. For an excellent general overview of this process (and Caucano history in
general), see Valencia Llano, Estado soberano del Cauca, 226 – 282; see also Marco
Palacios, Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia, 1875 –1994 (Bogotá: Grupo
Editorial Norma, 1995), 15 –71; Vicente Cárdenas to Sergio Arboleda, Quito, 2 Sept.
1878, ACC, FA, sig. 1506. Of course, Liberals’ eventual rejection of their popular
allies was not unique to Colombia. See Mallon, Peasant and Nation; Guy P. C.
Thomson with David G. LaFrance, Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism in
Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra ( Wilmington,
Del.: SR Books, 1999).
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century politics can only be understood in relation to the interaction between
elites and subalterns in wars, elections, and daily life. Colombian popular liberals’ political strength ensured that politics was not only a contest between
factions of elite gentlemen whose clients followed them mindlessly but also a
space that subalterns could appropriate and reframe, even given their limited
means. While popular liberals pursued their own speciﬁc social and economic
goals, their politics more generally affected the course and depth of Colombian
democracy. Afro-Caucanos made signiﬁcant progress in transforming postemancipation society and politics in Colombia, especially compared to the
United States or Brazil. Although late in the century some Conservatives and
Liberals did manage to restrict the very open and democratic political culture
of mid-nineteenth-century Colombia and to exclude many popular liberals
from politics, the bond between Liberals and Afro-Colombians was not broken — only weakened.142 Indeed, the association of Afro-Colombians and Liberals would continue through future civil wars up to the present day, although
Afro-Caucanos would never again play such a dominant role in the nation’s politics. In the nineteenth century — if less so through much of the twentieth —
common people, and especially people of African descent, were able to seize
the opportunity to make the still-undeﬁned nation their own.

142. For twentieth-century relations, see W. John Green, Gaitanismo, Left
Liberalism, and Popular Mobilization in Columbia (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida,
2003).

